Anti-Islam Propaganda in Europe (Contribution )

Interviewed By European Muslims staff

Why is the West focusing on Islam? The European Muslims page at IslamOnline.net (IOL) has just opened the door for a discussion on the increasing hostile incidents against Islam and Muslims in Europe (e.g. the Prophet-defaming cartoons and Wilders's film attacking the Qur'an). We have sent a list of questions pertaining to the topic to a number of European Muslim and non-Muslim experts and intellectuals whose contributions are expected to enrich the debate. Responding to our questions, Bashy Quraishy, president of the Brussels-based European Network Against Racism (ENAR), highlighted various issues related to the topic in discussion. IOL: Do you think the recent campaigns are directed toward Islam as a religion or toward Muslims as individuals? Why? And if they are targeting Islam, are they targeting the pillars of Islam or the religious interpretations? Quraishy: One of the topics that are increasingly discussed in the Western societies today is Islam and the challenge it poses, not to Christianity or Judaism as divine religions but to the norms of the European culture, the Western way of living, and the humanistic values the Western civilization is built on. This discourse has found its way right into the top political leadership and mass media and down to the population in general. This mindset has produced an atmosphere where freedom of expression is misused to vent abusive opinions and hate speech. This has in turn given rise to Islamophobia and cultural racism. The question that arises is, "Why is the West focusing on Islam?" My qualified guess is that, after the fall of the Soviet empire, the only remaining ideology or system that stands in the way of the total Western dominance — commercial, political, and to some extent religious — is Islam and the Muslim communities. Another factor is the historical rivalry and competition between Islam and Christianity for geographical dominance and getting new followers. Islam has now 1.3 billion followers worldwide and is the majority religion in nearly 60 countries. It is also said to be the fastest growing faith in Africa, the US, and Europe. Most of the oil resources are under the control of countries that profess to be Muslim. Furthermore, in order to physically occupy the oil-rich Middle East or to start any future confrontation between Christianity and Islam, the political forces consider demonizing Islam and its followers a useful tool in their hands. They would need to win the majority of public support in the West to carry out "a clash of civilizations" or to spread democracy a la George W. Bush. And such public backing can only come if Islam is portrayed as a terrible enemy. Some observers may find this rationale far-fetched or at worst my prejudice against the West. I wish that this feeling was so individual-based, but the reality is that I have heard of such scenarios from people from Morocco to Indonesia, as well as from many concerned Western citizens who wish to live in peace with Muslim communities and do not see Muslims as a threat or an enemy. Quraishy IOL: What are the main tools and arguments used in these campaigns? Quraishy: The campaigns against Islam as well as Muslim communities are manifested in the newspapers, on the radio, on television, films, theatre plays, church sermons, school curriculum, and popular literature. Even in entertainment magazines for men and children's books, one can find anti-Islam stories and remarks. Just have a look at airport bookshops all over the Western World; one can see piles of books and magazines with Islamophobic covers, articles, and interviews. The media constantly portrays non-European cultures — especially cultures from different Muslim countries — as inferior and primitive and incompatible with the Western values. Different newspapers do the same in their articles, foreign reports, editorials, and letters to the editors. Media studies carried out by universities, some serious journalists, and ethnic minority organizations have shown that nearly 70 percent of all media coverage of Muslims focuses either on crime, social problems, terrorism, militancy, or isolationism. Frequently, such coverage is not only exaggerated and distorted but also filled with lies. It is rare that a foreigner's race, religion, culture, and country of origin are not mentioned, whether or not this information is relevant. Islam is often presented as fanatical, barbarian, uncivilized, and medieval. It is constantly attacked with racial slurs similar to the way Jews were attacked in the 1930s. IOL: Do you think this kind of campaigns aims at paving the way for future violence from Muslims to reinforce a stereotypical image of Muslims? Quraishy: I do not subscribe to the notion that violent actions committed by individuals or a small group of people with a Muslim background should be termed "Muslim side." There are 60 countries with a Muslim-majority population, as well as a large number of Muslim communities in India, China, Russia, and various African countries. Muslims today constitute over 1.3 billion people. They should not be held responsible for few thousands who march in Tehran, Cairo, or Islamabad, burn Danish flags, or shout slogans. It is true that such violent reaction only gives more ammunition to those who seek confrontation. It is equally unfair to expect that people would not protest violently or react irrationally if some ideology-driven Islam haters in the West intentionally played with the emotions of those who neither have done any harm nor have had any ill will toward the West. In two surveys recently conducted by the World Economic Forum in January 2008 and Gallup Poll in February 2008, nearly 60 percent of the Europeans said that they consider any rapprochement with the Islamic world a threat, while over 70 percent of Muslims in the Islamic world expressed a desire for democracy, human rights, and a dialogue with the West. These surveys clearly reject this false perception in the West: that Muslims hate democracy, dislike the Western values, and support terrorism. The reason why many Muslims — whether practicing or not — react to Western criticisms of Islamic countries and practices is that they are well aware of their history, take pride in Islam's achievements, and — based upon the past relationships — are suspicious of the Christians' motives. Muslims also feel singled out in a variety of ways; for example, in the UK, Sikhs and Jews are accepted as ethnic or racial groups for the purposes of the Race Relations Act 1976, but as yet Muslims receive no such recognition or protection under the law. This also became obvious in Denmark when the attorney general refused to prosecute the newspaper that commissioned and published 12 insulting caricatures of the Holy Prophet on September 30, 2005. This is a political judgment, not a legal assessment. It is the key argument in the whole decision. It separates the drawings from the accompanying text and separates both from their context of debate, from which they are inseparable and in which they should be assessed. If the cartoon matter remained restricted to one newspaper in one country, the damage could have been localized, but it was quickly followed by many newspapers and magazines throughout Europe in the name of freedom of expression and to show solidarity to the journalists community! IOL: Do you think secular Europe is a hotbed of these aggressive approaches? Why? And how can these approaches affect the Muslim communities in Europe? Quraishy: Stereotypical images of Islam in the West are not the result of misdeed on the part of the Muslims but are due to provocative campaigns that are deliberate and well-thought-out. Actually, Islamophobia is not a new phenomenon in Europe. A hostile view of Islam began in the eighth century when Muslims expanded into the Iberian Peninsula. Islam as a faith was rejected as a fundamental religion and seen as a direct challenge to Christianity. Muslims were seen as heretics and their Prophet as a diabolical fraud. By the time of the Crusades, Muslims were viewed as a geopolitical threat and military means were seen as the only way to address the danger to the Church. Ignorance about Islam and abject rejection of Muslim culture reached the peak in Dante Alighieri's Divine Comedy, itself considered the pinnacle of Western literature in the 13th century. Dante saw it fit to cast Prophet Muhammad(peace and blessings be upon him) and `Ali ibn Abi Talib, his cousin, to the ninth circle of Hell — one created for schismatics and sowers of discord. The idea that Muhammad was Hell-bound was further explored in a 1415 painting by Giovanni da Modena. The Last Judgment, which "adorns" a cathedral in Bologna, depicts a scantily clad, turbaned, and bearded Muhammad in agony as he is pulled into the pits of Hell by demons. Voltaire, who is considered one of the pioneers of free speech in Europe, was barefaced in his play Mahomet, traducing the Prophet in every which way in such a debasing manner. The personal attacks upon the Prophet were a buildup to justify and incite hatred toward Muslims. In 1095, the rallying slogan of Pope Urban II to "free the Holy Land from the vile, infidel Muslims" set in motion a series of marauding raids, pillage, murder, and mayhem that are collectively known as the Crusades. William Dalrymple, an eminent British scholar, said in the Independent, "Prejudices against Muslims — and the spread of idiotic stereotypes of Muslim behavior and beliefs — have been developing at a frightening rate in the last decade …. Anti-Muslim racism now seems in many ways to be replacing anti-Semitism as the principal Western expression of bigotry against 'the other.' Unfortunately, even if the term Islamophbia is a recent one, the fear, dislike, or hatred of Islam in the Western World is as ancient as Islam itself." The aggressive Western approaches have dire consequences, not only for the harmonious relations between the Western majorities and Muslim communities in the West but also for a peaceful coexistence in the world. Very few voices of reason are pointing out that Islam — being the second largest religion on the planet — cannot and should not be treated as an enemy or an ideology that the West has to conquer or defeat. Unfortunately, there are signs that such ways of thinking are being systematically advocated in certain political and intellectual circles in the Western World. If this opinion does take hold, it will be a sure recipe for disaster. IOL: How can the Muslims in Europe withstand these campaigns? Quraishy: Islamophobia is a matter at hand, and it must be dealt with as such, not tomorrow or the day after, but here and now. Dealing with Islamophbia now does not mean that we should ignore other pressing problems. There is no scale of discrimination against which we can measure the amount of racism. All types of racism are equally deplorable, and we should tackle them both on the long term and as an issue at hand. To do this, we have to look at various factors, such as stereotypical categories, key issues facing the Muslim communities externally and internally, and what can be done about this situation. Proposals with workable solutions from the civil society must be welcomed; especially those from the Muslim communities should be encouraged. Legal measures are the state's responsibility, but the civil society must demand these changes. A proactive and open-minded discussion concerning the accommodation between secular and religious forces in the society, including Muslim communities, is recommended, including A clear understanding that Islam is not a nationality or ethnicity but a faith. A closer look at the terminology used by the media in its coverage of Islam and Muslims in general and terrorism in particular. Disengaging Islam from terrorism or militancy in the media. Clear guidelines against Islamophobia from internationally respected organs, like the United Nations, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, European Union, and Council of Europe. Strong legislation against hate speech and incitement to religious hatred and propaganda. A monitoring system would be of great help. An ongoing dialogue with the media as to how to balance freedom of speech, covering events without prejudice, and being sensitive to the rights of minorities. Seminars and workshops for the journalistic community and resource persons among diverse Muslim groups. More transparency among Muslim communities, and quick response to wrong information in the media. Inviting mainstream journalists to the Muslim community arrangements so that they can see from close quarters what they are writing about. Inclusion of Islam in the religious studies at the primary- and middle-school levels. It should be done on a par with other faiths. Provision of information concerning Islam and Muslim cultures for the employees of diverse sectors of the society who normally come in contact with Muslim communities in daily life (e.g. health, education, and social and other public services). We should be visionary and practical. Instead of a constant mention of "evil ideology versus the democratic values of the West," we have to look at the Muslim communities as co-citizens, not as a fifth column or foreign culture. Muslim communities are here to stay, and we have to integrate them in an inclusive way, not as a cultural or religious entity that should be "Europeanized" or looked at as a cultural threat. We should involve people in the whole fabric of the society. At the same time, Muslim communities must act as true ambassadors of classical Islam, which teaches kindness, beautiful language, and forgiveness. As the Muslim communities came from outside the Western World and decided to make this part of the globe their home, they have to be mindful of many local concerns. Do not impose your wishes or demand your rights using unpleasant manners. It is always helpful to negotiate and go halfway. Be a good example of your community so that the host society appreciates your efforts. Face the level of prejudice that some misguided Muslim people have about the Western lifestyle, traditions, or gender equality. Show respect for the society; one lives in and contributes to its well-being as much as one wishes the society to help the individual. Consider the country; live in it as your home. The sense of belonging is difficult to achieve, but one must show loyalty, solidarity, and care for the surroundings. A change in the attitudes toward the Muslim communities would only come when the society notices a common bond. Muslims have to work internally on their own prejudices toward other groups. Muslims do have tools and resources to conceptualize; think positively and live peacefully and be respectful to diversity. Religious observance and traditional practices must be acted upon with sensitivity to one's fellow human being. Both Islam and Christianity wish to fulfill the spiritual void in one's life. Every one can choose his or her own way. Last but not least, violence, death threats, and force are very un-Islamic. Muslim communities should follow the path of righteousness, not of despair. With all the complexity of the situation, I believe that human beings are adaptable to circumstances and necessity. This can be made easy if the politicians and media stop fanning the flames of prejudices and hatred and let people live their lives as they see fit. Now that you have perceived Quraishy's views on the topic, what are yours?

Political Thought of Islam

Political Thought of Islam

By: Professor Maqsood Jafri



The political system advocated by Islam needs to be clarified. The modern Muslim scholars say that Islam is a democratic religion, yet many Muslim clerics today do not believe in democracy. I would like to discuss briefly what I feel is meant by Islamic democracy.

A few verses of the Holy Quran are presented here which give us the basics for Islamic political thought. In Sura Baqara (The Heifer) the Quran says: “And remember when your Lord said to the angels, I am going to place a successor (Khalifa) on Earth” (2:30). This verse is about the vice-regency of Adam. Then again in the chapter The Heifer about Abraham the Quran says: “And remember when the Lord of Abraham tried him with certain commands which he fulfilled. Allah said to him, verily, I am going to make you a leader (Imam) of mankind. Abraham said, ‘And my offspring? Allah said, ‘my providence includes not the wrong-doers (oppressors)’”(2:124). This verse shows that divine leadership is not for transgressors and tyrants. It is for righteous and just people.

In Sura Saad the Quran says: “O, David! Verily we have placed you as a successor (Khalifa) on the earth, so judge between men with truth and justice.” (38:26). David was not only a leader or caliph or prophet but he was ruler as well. Hence according to the Quran a ruler must be truthful and just. It is the religious obligation of a ruler to provide justice to everyone irrespective of color, cult, class, country and creed. In Sura The Adoration while talking about the children of Israel the Quran says: “And we appointed from among them, leaders (Imams), giving guidance under our command, so long as they preserved with patience and continue to have faith in our signs” (32:24). Hence we see that patience and faith are the basic requirements for divine leadership.

In Sura Al-Qasas the Quran says: “And we wished to be gracious to those who were being depressed in the land, to make them (Imams) leaders and make them heirs. (28:5). This verse shows that Allah condemns transgressors and oppressors and divinely helps the oppressed ones making them leaders and heirs on the basis of justice and piety. Then at another place the Quran alludes about divine rulers as a man of physical fitness and of knowledge. According to Sura The Heifer in verse 247 the Quran tells us about Jalut appointed as king because of his knowledge and physical prowess. The Shias consider Imam Ali fit for these merits.

In Sura Al-Nisa (The Women) The Quran says: “O you who believe! Obey Allah, and obey the Messenger, and those charged with authority among you” (4:59). The above cited verses give us the basics of Islamic political morality. These verses tell us that a leader or a ruler in Islamic state must be a man of certain qualities. Muslim political thinkers like Al-Mawardi and Ibu Katiba also write that a Muslim ruler must be a pious, knowledgeable and just man with administrative qualities. There are numerous sayings of the Holy Prophet that instruct us to obey the men of piety and virtuosity. The tyrants and evil-doers must not be accepted as leaders or rulers.

These passages leave unanswered the question of how a ruler is to be chosen. Is it through nomination or through elections? On this point we find Muslims divided. The Sunni sect believes that the Holy Prophet did not appoint his successor. He totally left it up to the Ummah (community). The Sunnis believe in “Ijmah”(consensus), which, of course bears some similarity to democracy. They say that when the Holy Prophet was on deathbed, he asked Hazrat Abu Bakr to lead the prayers. To their way of thinking this request indicates the superiority of Hazrat Abu Bakr.

After the Holy Prophet of Islam died, the Helpers of Medina and the Immigrants of Mecca had a heated discussion on the right of caliphate. Both the groups exchanged hot words. According to Tabari ultimately Hazrat Omar presented the name of Hazrat Abu Bakr and he was elected in Saqifa Bani Saada. Then Hazrat Abu Bakr, on his deathbed, nominated Hazrat Omar as his heir, who in turn nominated six people and asked for elections amongst them. They were Abdur Rehman, Uthman, Ali, Talah, Zubair and Saad bin Waqas. Hazrat Uthman was elected. Ali did not participate in the competition. When Hazrat Uthman was assassinated the majority of people openly elected Hazrat Ali as their Caliph. The Sunnis maintain that, after these four guided caliphs, the Mawiyya turned the caliphate into a monarchy.

The book of Abu Aula Mududi, entitled “Caliphate And Monarchy” sheds ample light on this issue. Now, the Sunni clerics say that Mushawart (consensus and counseling) must be adopted for Islamic concept of Caliphate. By Islamic democracy they mean the election of pious, honest and just people.

By contrast, Western democracy can change the basic moral and divine laws and regulations. The Western parliaments have passed rules favoring and allowing homosexuality, which is not permitted in divine scriptures. In an Islamic democratic state, the basic rules are the divine rules and cannot be changed by the decision of majority. Sovereignty lies with God. We can make laws and rules that deal with day-to- day matters of life, but these laws should not be contrary to the basics of Islam. Hence we see that the Sunni modern thinkers support parliaments and democratic system.

On the other hand, the Shias say that the Holy Prophet (PBUH) had nominated Hazrat Ali as his successor. They believe in the concept of Immah, which means that the door of Prophethood was closed after the Holy Prophet Muhammad, and divine leadership (Immah) was prescribed by the Quran and the Prophet. They mostly quote from the Sura The Israelites the following verse: “On the Day when we will summon every people with their Imam (leader).” (17:71) By this verse the Shias mean that Hazrat Ali is their Imam and under his banner they will resurrect on the Day of Judgment. They say that when the Holy Prophet invited his near relatives to dinner and asked them to support Islam, none declared support except Hazrat Ali. On that occasion, the Prophet said; “O, Ali you are my brother, my minister and my successor.” The famous Western historian, Gibbon, in his book, “The Rise and Fall of the Roman Empire” also mentions this event. They also say that in Hadith-e-Thaqalan, quoted by Muslims, Tirmidli, Ahmed ibn Hanbal, Tibrani and Mustadrak Al-Hakim, the vicegerency of Hazrat Ali is proved. The Prophet’s pronouncement at Ghadeer-e-Khum, “whoever’s Master I am, then this Ali is his master” shows that Hazrat Ali was nominated as the heir by the Prophet of Islam.

The Shias also cite from the Sura the Consultation:” “No reward do I ask of you for this except the love of those near to (my) kin.” (42:23) By this verse they infer that the Household of the Holy Prophet on divine merits had the right of Caliphate (Khalafah) and leadership (Imamah). According to the Shia sect, it was Hazrat Ali who was the legal and divine heir of the Prophet.

But let us draw a conclusion out of this controversy. In my opinion, both the sects, the Sunnis and the Shias, believe in the divine merits of the status of caliphate and leadership. The Sunnis also believe in the Immah and Velayah of Hazrat Ali. Practically speaking, we have no other way but to go for elections and select pious and just people as our caliphs and leaders. Iran is a Shia state. They have a parliament, and they have a system of checks on the programs and policies created by the parliament. They have a council of guides. In Pakistan they have Islamic ideological council which deals with the laws. If there is any doubt about a law, it is referred to Islamic council for approval. This means that we have to adopt democracy to run the state. The Shia concept of Imamah also implies that the character of the leadership must be noble, just and righteous. If we regard these practices neutrally and impartially, we see that there is little basic difference in political thought between the Sunnis and the Shias. Both believe in the vicegerency of righteous individuals. The only way to see to it that such righteous people do indeed become leaders is Islamic democracy based in justice, peace and piety.

Finally, it is essential to mention that the Shias are known as “The Twelvers” because they believe in the spiritual and worldly leadership of the twelve Imamss from Imam Ali to Imam Mehdi. Some Shia clerics believe that as they were the pious and just personalities and also belonged to the Household of the Prophet. Hence, on merits, they had the right to be our caliphs (Khalifa) as well. However, after the disappearance from view of Imam Mehdi, we find some jurists (Faqaha) claiming to be his heirs, assistants, or the lieutenants. They are simply religious people. The majority of them refused to participate in politics.

Imam Khomeini, in his book entitled “Islamic Statem” has given the idea of the government of clerics. Another great Shia cleric, Ayatollah Shariat Madari, who was Imam Khomeini’s contemporary, did not agree with his political ideas and deeds. Even Imam Khomeini did not reject the modern method of democratic elections. This shows that practically we have to reject nomination and go for elections. In Sura Shura we find that even the Prophet is asked to council with people in day-to-day social and political matters. The concept of Imamah in the Ismailis and Bohras is a spiritual monarchy having no Islamic sanction. Hence it can be said that the Sunnis and the Shias have no other way but to act upon the Islamic democracy, which is based on freedom, equality, peace, progress, justice and piety and is enacted through general elections. Here we all unite and reject monarchy, militarism and fascism.

http://www.irfi.org/articles/articles_201_250/political_thought_of_islam.htm

Revisions Add to Islamic Moderation * Interview with Rafiq Habib

Interviewed By Abdul Rahman Hashim

Rafiq Habib Dr. Rafiq Habib is one of the most prominent specialists in Islamic movements. Commenting on the revisions adopted by Dr. Sayyid Imam (theorizer of Jihad Group in Egypt), he said that they have nothing to do with the security pressures or torture practiced against the members of the group in prisons. These revisions, he said, came as a product of a vision assuming that the use of armed violence in the process of internal change proved to be a failure and that violence caused harm to the "Islamic" groups and the Egyptian society as a whole. Dr. Habib argued that the revisions of Jihad Group and Al-Jama`ah Al-Islamiyyah can be regarded as a value added to the moderation of Islam, (Wasattiyah), and a peaceful approach toward change. Dr. Habib urged the heralds of those revisions to establish visions based on peaceful change, where this change itself can become a form of struggle that gathers the Islamic and national powers together, so that no violence happens anymore. Revisions: A Product of Experience IslamOnline.net (IOL): What are the real reasons behind the revisions? When and how did they start? Dr. Habib: I believe that the real reasons behind the revisions are included in the experience itself. This is because the use of violence in the process of internal change harmed all parties involved, including the Jihad-oriented groups, as well as the Egyptian society and the authorities. This also had a negative impact on the da`wah-oriented role of these groups as far as Al-Jama`ah Al-Islamiyyah is concerned. Moreover, it affected the sympathy of the masses that used to support them, whether Al-Jama`ah Al-Islamiyyah or Jihad Group. This means that the consequences of using violence led to "reassessing" this approach , and this was the real reason behind the revisions. This vision is supported by the fact that the ideas related to such revisions appeared for the first time in the beginning of the 1980s among those who were sentenced after the incident of President Sadat's assassination. However, they remained as individual ideas until they were adopted by the movements themselves; namely, Al-Jama`ah Al-Islamiyyah in 1997 and Jihad Group in 2007. IOL: How can one differentiate between the thoughts of takfir (accusing others of disbelief), which appeared in prisons during the 1960s, and the takfir-related thoughts, which appeared later during the 1970s, including the revisions that followed them? Dr. Habib: When the idea of takfir appeared during the 1960s at the hands of Shukri Mustafa and others, it was a product of the experience of prison. Consequently, it had nothing to do with the project of the Muslim Brotherhood, which appeared about four decades before that time. On their part, the Muslim Brotherhood could refute and overwhelm this idea from the very beginning. Yet, the takfir-related thoughts, which appeared during the 1970s, did not come as a result of the experience of prison, as they actually expressed an attitude that rejected life as a whole and the prevalent political conditions in Egypt and other Arab countries at that time. Thus, these thoughts continued and led to internal and external armed confrontations, which have been there since the 1970s until now. This is because such thoughts still exist in Al-Qaeda and other similar groups, and that is why we call what happened in the 1970s a "birth" of the phenomenon of a wide-ranging Islamic rejection of the existing state of affairs. Nevertheless, it is quite important to confirm that the revisions are not a "reassessment" of an attitude that rejects our present situation. They are only a reexamination of how to deal with this status quo. IOL: Some argue that the reason behind these revisions is the security pressures and cruel torture undergone by members of Jihad Group inside prisons. What do you think about this? Dr. Habib: First of all, if these revisions came as a result of torture, they would have appeared long before that. But, in fact, following the assassination of Sadat, these revisions started as a form of self-criticism, but they were limited to the idea of whether the assassination of Sadat had any positive effect or it only had a negative effect on the group with no change of the existing state of affairs in Egypt. Later on, the revisions turned into a collective, communal operation (i.e. they became group-based, not individual ideas). The first statement about them was made in 1997, but the security officials did not take them seriously. Anyway, the revisions were not to be made widely known under such circumstances, as the security officials of the time refused to have any dialogue with the Islamists and regarded violent security actions and reactions as the only solution. In my opinion, the security officials started to change their attitude, firstly when a new minister of the interior came to office and secondly after the incident of Luxor. This incident was a start of random violence undertaken by small groups that were not under the control of any leadership from the big groups. In 1998, the year following the first statement about the revisions, the security authorities dealt with this initiative prudently; then they started to react to it gradually. Of course, the security officials tried to use these revisions for their own interest, but the historic leaders of Al-Jama`ah Al-Islamiyyah reasoned that it was very important to prevent bloodshed because they realized that any opposite procedure might lead Egypt to a massive bloodshed as was the case in Algeria. The historic leaders of Al-Jama`ah Al-Islamiyyah cooperated with the security authorities because the latter gave them the opportunity to dialogue with the bases of the groups. Such cooperation was crucial, simply because if the revisions came out without enough accord concerning them among the bases, this would limit the impact of the revisions and allow for the emergence of groups seceding from Al-Jama`ah Al-Islamiyyah. IOL: Do you think that Al-Jama`ah Al-Islamiyyah and Jihad Group can be politically used against the Muslim Brotherhood? Sayyid Imam or Dr Fadl Dr. Habib: I think that the security authorities are trying to make use of Al-Jama`ah Al-Islamiyyah and Jihad Group in the confrontation with the Muslim Brotherhood. But the authorities fear any political confrontation between them because the leaders of Al-Jama`ah Al-Islamiyyah and Jihad Group have a historical weight, which makes it dangerous — from the viewpoint of the ruling regime — to let them indulge in any political work. Besides, I believe that the leaders of Al-Jama`ah Al-Islamiyyah and Jihad Group may refuse to be used against the Muslim Brotherhood. Revisions and Cease of Violence IOL: Do you think that these revisions will close the door of violence in the future? Dr. Habib: I believe that these revisions can limit violence, but they cannot totally prevent it. Revisions of the religious rulings justifying takfir and assassination make it difficult to resort to the rulings themselves. Still, the phenomenon of violence did not come as a result of Shari`ah rulings but as a product of an existing state of affairs with which the rulings justifying takfir and assassination were a mere attempt of dealing with a rejected, complicated status quo. The problem is that this status quo has not changed so far, and this makes the reasons behind violence still present. Violence did not also come as a response to a religious idea. Rather, it was a political reaction to a rejected reality, and this reaction appeared in the form of an Islamic movement. The reason behind deterioration was not only economic or political; it included morals and values as well, which made it an inclusive civilizational collapse that required the appearance of Islamic movements seeking to bring the Ummah back to its religious and civilizational sources of reference. Thus, Al-Qaeda and its thought will remain during the coming years, especially because of the US and Zionist policies being practiced in the region. Additionally, this violence will sometimes extend into the inside of the Arab countries in consequence of the alliance between the Arab regimes and the Zionist-American project. But the part that is to be most affected by the revisions would be "violence versus ruling regimes." The incidents of violence may recede in the Arab countries, and the idea of undertaking violent actions in Western countries may slightly decline as well. In this way, there will be more focus on confronting the US and Israel in the regions witnessing military confrontations. By this I mean that the revisions will push Al-Qaeda (the real origin of repelling jihad), toward focusing on resisting the occupation. IOL: How far have these revisions influenced the trend of violence inside and outside Egypt? Dr. Habib: Egypt has played a central role in the history of both moderate and extremist Islamic movements since the beginning of the twentieth century. Most of the thoughts of violent movements stemmed from Egypt. A person like Sayyid Imam Ash-Sharif has an effective position inside and outside Egypt. That is why these revisions can play a role outside Egypt, but its role and effect may be besieged by the continuation of the US and Zionist policies, yet it is difficult for activists in the armed Islamic movement to turn to inactivity and apathy. Therefore, as I said, the best thing we hope for is that armed jihad be redefined and restricted to the occupied regions. IOL: Some argue that these revisions mainly serve the peaceful approach of change. What do you think? Dr. Habib: Obviously, the appearance of Al-Jama`ah Al-Islamiyyah's revisions represents an additional support to the moderation of Islam and the peaceful approach toward change. Such is a success of the Islamic school to which the Muslim Brotherhood belonged from the very beginning of its emergence. However, the real problem in the revisions, whether those of Al-Jama`ah Al-Islamiyyah or those of Jihad Group, is that they have not set a methodology of peaceful change as an alternative to the methodology of forceful change. So many times, these revisions would find it sufficient to confirm that the Islamic movement is in a stage of istid`af (i.e. weakness), and so it cannot use force as it is not yet qualified for this. This refers to a provisional cease of violence that would not turn into a permanent cease unless a peaceful methodology of change is set to be applied inside the Arab and Muslim countries. The armed jihad would then be restricted to "repelling jihad" or jihad against the occupiers. Incomplete Revisions? IOL: In your opinion, what do these revisions lack? Dr. Habib: The problem that these revisions raise is that they affect the members and leaders of existing movements, but they may not have a big impact on what we may call groups adopting random violence. Such are small groups that adopt the ideology of violence and undertake violent operations. Within a short period of time, they disappear and then other groups appear, as in the case of Taba incidents. This random violence needs a social and political treatment so that we may be able to treat the state of general rejection afflicting many youth. IOL: Following these revisions, how do you see the political future of the leaders and members of Jihad Group and Al-Jama`ah Al-Islamiyyah? Dr. Habib: The political status quo in Egypt is witnessing revisions by the armed groups released with the restriction that they abstain from indulging in politics. Meanwhile, the Muslim Brotherhood is being inclusively besieged in an attempt to drive its members away from the political arena. However, the door is left open for some groups belonging to extremist Salafism provided that they work only in the religious field without approaching politics. Because they are considered peaceful groups, they are also asked to confront the Muslim Brotherhood. Consequently, these groups can be confronted with the thoughts of radicalism and thoughts questioning their principles. This can eventually lead to keeping the Islamic movements away from the political arena. It can also raise generations within the society that adopt extremism. This, in turn, can pave the way for reproducing the ideology of violence. When the extremist thoughts are kept away from the political arena, they can easily turn into armed actions. Many extremist Salafist trends propagate visions featuring radicalism, and they are the same visions on which the Jihadist Salafist trend was established, whether on the part of Jihad Group of Egypt, Al-Qaeda, or other similar groups. This means that these trends construct a very wide base of Islamic radicalism without indulging their bases into any political work. This makes them more isolated, which can make them tend to radicalism. Moreover, they would have juristic views that justify using force for changing the status quo, but this can happen only when they feel that they are not weak. Future of Jihad Group IOL: Once again, do you think that Sayyid Imam (or Dr. Fadl) is the first influential factor behind the revisions of Jihad Group and Al-Qaeda at the international level? Dr. Habib: I think that Sayyid Imam was one of the most effective figures during a certain period of time, but the phenomenon of violence was not born because of a certain person or a certain group of persons. Rather, it came as a result of a historical moment to which those persons responded in a way that drew others who followed them. Even the violence-establishing ideology was taken from books; it existed from the beginning, but it was figured out based on a certain understanding of the status quo as well as a political vision that explained that convoluted status quo. Then, on the grounds of such vision, relevant rulings were deduced. Dr. Fadl is just redefining the status quo, which is still rejected according to him, but he is considering the Muslims' current state of affairs and knows that they are in a state of weakness. In this way, he deduces rulings conforming to the way he views this state of affairs. IOL: In your opinion, what are the challenges facing the leaders and members of Al-Jama`ah Al-Islamiyyah and Jihad Group following these revisions? Dr. Habib: Certainly, there is a security-related factor that precludes any political activity on the part of the leaders and members of Al-Jama`ah Al-Islamiyyah and Jihad Group. This includes hindering any organizational activities. Accordingly, the leaders said they would occupy themselves only with da`wah-oriented activities. Still, they can practice such daw`ah activities only as individuals, not as organized groups. This can eventually lead to the following question: "How can this form of da`wah reach the political field to change it according to the Islamic vision adopted by these groups?" This, in turn, means that these leaders are facing a primary challenge: setting a methodology of change that their followers and members comply with as a way to close the door of resorting to the methodology of violence. Another challenge is that any methodology of peaceful change will lead to some political activity. That is why I expect that these organizations and their leaders will try to practice da`wah with the tightest possible limits so that they can carry out wider activities of da`wah, after which they would reach the political arena once again. In the meantime, the Egyptian security authorities will besiege these leaders in an attempt to destroy their political and da`wah-oriented future. IOL: How do you see the future of Al-Jama`ah Al-Islamiyyah and Jihad Group after these revisions? Dr. Habib: As dubbed in the very beginning, these revisions were an initiative for stopping violence. Until now, they have not been turned into a complementary Islamic project that aims at changing the existing state of affairs. The initiatives started with suppressing the previous rulings justifying assassination. This was not because the leaders saw the then status quo as being better than what it used to be (according to their perception), but it was because they found out that using force during that time would harm their main goal: change. Accordingly, the related justifications would include the idea of istid`af (weakness) and the permission of tuqyah (hiding one's real beliefs to protect oneself from others in case of danger). This means that the leaders still reject the status quo and believe that it has to be changed, but they only suppressed the ruling calling for changing it by force. This vision is the beginning of a new stage but not a final one. Thus, if the revisions stop at this limit, Al-Jama`ah Al-Islamiyyah and Jihad Group will end historically; if the revisions present a new complementary vision, this will actually be a new birth with which those leaders will enter the field of politics. This is because the process of change will sooner or later reach the political field, even if it started with the social field. Religion and Violence IOL: Some say that all ideological projects, whether Arab or international, religious or secular, are deteriorating. What is your comment? Dr. Habib: I think that this argument is wrong, because there is no society without an ideological framework of reference. Also, there is not any political system without a source of reference. However, the utilitarian secularist vision has made some people think that the world is moving toward a state in which it would achieve interests without values. Such a vision is itself an ideology that has nothing to do with human values, as it is based on the absolute values of materialism. In our countries, however, we are trying to restore our identity and civilization. Therefore, the Islamic project will remain the real motivator for the idea of restoring our civilizational belonging, because our societies would deteriorate and fall apart because of the materialistic values. This would push them via the fitrah (natural disposition) toward restoring their human and spiritual values so that they can in turn restore their coherence, firmness, and progress. IOL: But how far is the phenomenon of violence connected to the phenomenon of religiosity? Dr. Habib: The seventies of the past century witnessed a phenomenon that we call resorting to religion. This phenomenon appeared because the society fully realized that its values and morals had started to deteriorate. Thus, the society started to restore its identity by restoring its religiosity. Such is the background from which reasonable religious revitalization came out, and so did the extremist religious thought, as well as the violence-based thought of the armed groups. Islamists Behind Bars The phenomenon of extremism and violence, along with the phenomenon of religious revitalization, came as a result of deterioration in the societal status quo, as well as the deterioration of Egypt's position on the Arab and Islamic levels. Meanwhile, the authorities could not express those visions of religious revitalization in a way that would turn them into a project of renaissance and communal progress. With all these factors, the process of religious revitalization, which was basically motivated by a need to change the status quo, faced the following options: 1. To adhere to moderation. But the present circumstances would not make that easy. 2. To isolate itself from the status quo. But this would allow extremism to grow. 3. To face the status quo, But this would allow violence to appear, especially because peaceful confrontation with the status quo (which is the approach of the Muslim Brotherhood) would lead to violence on the part of the authorities (and this sheds some light on the reason behind the wide appearance of violence among Islamic trends). Therefore, I would assume that striking Islamic moderation and the peaceful methodology of change represented by the Muslim Brotherhood and others is considered a strike against the ideology on which the revisions are based. Moreover, this is apt to create an environment where extremism can widely grow up among the masses and appear again in violent forms. It is still important to understand the idea of violence as a methodology of change because it was based firstly on rejection of the status quo and secondly on the inexistence of channels for peaceful change. That is why I believe that the Egyptian authorities' policy of closing the door of peaceful change leads to the reappearance of violence. Meanwhile the revisions (including those of Sayyid Imam) try to qualify the Islamic trends that previously adopted violence for working in the peaceful political field. After all, the leaders of the revisions can delay the stage of political change, but they cannot cancel it. IOL: Finally, what is your advice for the proponents of revisions? Dr. Habib: We should greet the proponents of these revisions, for they endured many accusations and shouldered the burden of issuing such revisions when they were imprisoned. Yet, they should set up visions basically adopting peaceful change, so that such change can be a form of struggle that gathers the Islamic and national powers together. If the peaceful political struggle stops, this will open the door once again for the return of violence.

Pakistan's Red Mosque: Start of Unrest - The Full Story Behind the Red Mosque Crisis

By Misbah Abdul-Baqi Expert in Pakistani Issues -- Islamabad

Pakistani paramilitary soldier stands guard as Muslim students sit near the Red Mosque in Islamabad. (Reuters photo) The Red Mosque crisis that claimed tens of lives of Pakistanis the other day cannot unequivocally be detached from the overall portrait of political conditions worsening day by day in Pakistan. The crisis in question is just the tip of the iceberg of a deep-rooted popular rage against Musharraf's policies that revealed since he came to power, especially when it comes to his alliance to the US, which is seen as a sign of religious and national disloyalty. Musharraf's decision to storm the Red Mosque came amid reports that he was in dire need to tell the US and his western allies that he is still powerful enough to firmly control the so called Islamic radicalism on the rise in Pakistan. Musharraf's message may be clear to some, but some others may perceive his excessive force policy as unjustified and totalitarian. But the question still lingering domestically and internationally is: What does the future hold for Musharraf and for the Pakistanis under his military rule? This fatwa outraged General Musharraf, and the government started to seek ways to eliminate this school... The Beginning of the Crisis The first and most serious problem started when the fatwa council affiliated with the Red Mosque, headed by Sheikh Abdul Aziz Ghazi, issued a fatwa in 2005 at the onset of clashes between the Pakistani forces and the tribes in the Waziristan region. The fatwa said that soldiers in the army of an Islamic state are prohibited to fight the Muslim subjects of this state and that if any government trooper is killed in the battle between the Pakistani army and the tribesmen, this trooper is considered infidel, whereas if any tribesman is killed in this battle, he will be considered a martyr. This fatwa outraged General Musharraf, and the government started to seek ways to eliminate this school and take it out of the Pakistani capital, Islamabad. This showed clearly in statements made by Abdul Rashid Ghazi in which he said the government establishment, including the Pakistani military intelligence, "exercises pressures on us to back down from this fatwa, but we told them that the fatwa is not a government decision that can be replaced with another one." He also added that the fatwa is a Shari`ah-related judgment and that backing down from it means rejecting the Qur'an and Sunnah on which the fatwa is based. He also accused the government of campaigning against him: "Since then, the government has launched a heated campaign, not only against me and Sheikh AbdulAziz Ghazi, but against the Red Mosque and its affiliated establishments, with the government always declaring that the Red Mosque is a safe haven for terrorists." The government cashed in on the fatwa and expanded charges against Abdul Rashid Ghazi accusing him of planning to bomb the parliament and other state establishments. For fear of arrest, Ghazi disappeared and the police failed to arrest him. So the government seized his car and fabricated a tale by allowing the media to see his car as a booby-trapped one full of ammunition. But the government retreated from this charge, and Minister of Religious Affairs and Islamic Endowments Mohammed Ijazulhaq, the eldest son of General Zia-ul-Haq, announced then that Sheikh Abdul Aziz Ghazi had nothing to do in planning such attacks, while the actual perpetrators were brought to justice. Musharraf didn't waste any chance to convict the Red Mosque and its leaders, including alleged death threats that Sheikh Abdul Aziz Ghazi and his brother Sheikh Abdul Rashid Ghazi received. Two mosques were demolished on January 20, Jamia Hafsa and the Red Mosque's madrasah were among the schools to be demolish. When the London bombings took place on July, 7, 2005, and some British youth of Pakistani origin were charged, and the media outlets reported that some of them visited some madrasahs (school dedicated to teaching Islamic sciences) in Pakistan, the government sought to involve the Red Mosque in this charge and decided to inspect the school under the pretext of looking for a suspect in the London bombings, but the female students of Jamia Hafsa (a female only madrasah and part of the Red Mosque compound) stood up against this attempt and barred the police from entering the school. These students came under tear gas bombs and some of them were injured, but the police couldn't enter the school. However, the Ministry of Interior registered a criminal case against the two brothers in one of Islamabad police centers. The problem that escalated the conflict was the decision of the Islamabad municipality to demolish seven mosques in the city under the pretext that some of them were built on usurped government land and that some of them pose a security threat to some nearby senior government officials. The decision was a strange and serious one in the eyes of the Pakistani society, which is known to be a conservative one. Actually, the municipality had demolished two mosques on January 20, 2007. Jamia Hafsa and the Red Mosque's madrasah for males were among the schools that the municipality decided to demolish. But students of the madrasahs staged large demonstrations, spearheaded by Sheikh Abdul Aziz Ghazi and a galaxy of `ulamaa' (religious scholars), and they were able to stop the demolition process. Minister of Religious Affairs and Islamic Endowments Mohammed Ijazulhaq stepped in and asked the Interior Affairs Minister to stop the procedures of demolishing the mosque. Analysts see that the government quarters didn't seek a peaceful solution to the problem. Takeover of Children's Libraries The female students of Jamia Hafsa took hold of the children's library neighboring their school on January 20, 2007, and they closed the library door and barred the government employees and the library goers from entering, saying that they would not leave the library except after the government sent a written guarantee pledging not to demolish schools and mosques. Although many prominent religious and political figures participated in a dialogue between the government and the Red Mosque administration, the problem wasn't solved. Analysts see that the government quarters didn't seek a peaceful solution to the problem. This showed clearly in statements by ruling party chairman Choudry Shugaat Hussein in which he announced on July 2, 2007, that his efforts to settle the problem of the Red Mosque were quashed by some official quarters. Likewise, efforts of Minister Ijazulhaq went down the drain. Even he came under heated criticism on the part of his fellow ministers with General Musharraf reprimanding him several times, according to a well-informed reporter Erfan Seddiqi in one of his daily column in a local paper, on July 5, 2007. Implementing Shari`ah in a Taliban-Like Way Media outlets quoted Sheikh Abdul Aziz Ghazi as saying that Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings be upon him) "brought me good news and told me 300 times in my dreams to move to implement the Shari`ah of Allah." This prompted some to say that the dreams had a role in the establishing of student movements in the same way as that of Taliban, which also started with dreams as the Taliban spearheads used to say. They actually embarked on implementing the Shari`ah in the Red Mosque vicinity, and the government didn't dare to use force against them. "We today announce the implementation of the Shari`ah in the area under our control, where all cases, from now on, will be adjudicated according to the Shari`ah of Allah, glory be to Him," said Sheikh Abdul Aziz Ghazi in his speech announcing the implementation of Shari`ah. In the same speech, he accused the government of collaborating with non-governmental organizations and other secular agencies in the country and of assuming a hostile stance to his movement, by spreading lies and framed charges against the followers of the movement. He also said that implementing Shari`ah is an obligation on every Muslim, and he asked even women and girls to participate in his movement. He added that his movement seeks goodness for all Muslims, men and women, and that one of its aims is to protect the chastity and honor of Muslim women and girls. He identified demands to the government, calling on it to listen to and implement them well. "First, the government has to stop the media campaign that includes false claims against the movement's male and female students. Second, it should remove all street posters and placards that contain immoral pictures, because these pictures play an influential, but wrong, role in the society. Third, it must close marijuana addicting centers. Fourth, the government must ban wine in Islamabad. Fifth, our movement seeks security and stability, and so the police should cooperate with us." "We don't seek clashes but we will not stay silent over any obstacles in the way of implementing Shari`ah," he added. Negative Acts Some male and female students of the Red Mosque committed some negative acts in the Pakistani capital, and the government didn't use force in response. Some of these acts included closing a house, holding a woman under charges of joining a prostitution ring, kidnapping three policemen under the pretext that the police detained a group of Al-Faridia university students, demanding some merchants to stop selling records that spread what they regard as moral corruption, and issuing a fatwa against the female Minister of Tourism for hugging a French man. The recent showdowns started on April 10, 2007, when the government announced the closure of the Red Mosque website and banned the radio programs that were transmitted via the short wave. On June 29, 2007, General Musharraf announced that a group of suicidal bombers affiliated with Al-Qaeda are hiding in the Red Mosque. On July 3, 2007, the paratroopers approached and sealed off the Red Mosque compound until finally the military troops stormed the mosque, on July 10, and killed the deputy leader, Sheikh Abdul Rashid Ghazi, a step that might have ended this particular crisis, but probably it will not end the dilemmas Musharraf has to face one after another. It was in 1965 that Sheikh Abdullah, the Red Mosque's first preacher, started to engage in politics. Historical Background In the fifties of the 20th century, the first preacher of the Red Mosque was Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, the father of both Sheikhs Abdul Aziz and Abdul Rashid Ghazi. He was born to a Baloch family in a village south of Pakistani Punjab region. He finished his primary Islamic education in the Punjab province then enrolled in a secondary school where the headmaster was Sheikh Mufti Mahmud, father of Malawi Fadhlurrahman who was the opposition leader in the Pakistani parliament. Then he joined the Islamic Bennouria University in Karachi to make more studies on Hadith and graduated in 1957. Then he worked as a preacher, teacher, and imam in various Karachi schools and mosques for nine years. When the Pakistani capital was moved from Karachi to Islamabad at the era of the then president of Pakistan Mohammed Ayoub Khan, Sheikh Abdullah moved from Karachi to Islamabad and was nominated in the first mosque built in Islamabad upon the request and recommendation of Sheikh Mohammed Yousuf Al-Bannouri, one of the Pakistani renowned scholars who was a professor and director of the Hadith Department at the Bennouria university from which Sheikh Abdullah graduated. It was in 1965 that Sheikh Abdullah, the Red Mosque's first preacher, started to engage in politics, at a time when the Khatm-ul-Nobowwa movement was active in 1973 and 1974. Most prominent of his mentors is Sheikh Al-Mufti Mahmoud, the secretary general of one of the Olema-ul-Islam society who was one of the active leaders in the movement and he is the sheikh who issued a fatwa endorsed by the parliament ruling that the Qadiani sect is an infidel one. Owing to this relation between the mosque preacher and one of the active leaderships in the Khatm-ul-Nobowwa movement, the Red Mosque became one of the movement's most active centers in Islamabad. When the opposition launched its uprising to topple the government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, president of Pakistan between 1971-1973 and prime minister in 1977, Sheikh Abdullah actively participated in the protests. Era of General Zia-ul-Haq When General Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq reached power in Pakistan in 1977, Sheikh Abdullah sought to cement relations with him given that the circumstances allowed such relations. These relations continued until the death of General Zia-ul-Haq in 1988. Sheikh Abdullah took advantage of his close relations, and throughout the rule of Zia-ul-Haq, he was nominated head of the Central Committee for Verifying the Start of the Hegira Month. He also set up two big schools in Islamabad, including one for educating girls. In the Red Mosque also, Sheikh Abdul Aziz Ghazi set up another school for boys, besides a number of mosques built with the efforts of Sheikh Abdullah in Islamabad. Sheikh Abdullah was killed in 1998 at the era of Nawaz Sherif, and the Shiites were accused of being behind the murder given that the sheikh was active against them in the last days of his life. Owing to his far-reaching relations with influential characters, whether senior government officials or prominent scholars, Sheikh Abdullah was invited to participate in most sessions that were held for discussing Pakistani issues, escorted by his eldest son Sheikh Abdul Aziz, whose father groomed to succeed him. http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&cid=1183484216983&pagename=Zone-English-Muslim_Affairs%2FMAELayout