Political Thought of Islam
By: Professor Maqsood Jafri
The political system advocated by Islam needs to be clarified. The modern Muslim scholars say that Islam is a democratic religion, yet many Muslim clerics today do not believe in democracy. I would like to discuss briefly what I feel is meant by Islamic democracy.
A few verses of the Holy Quran are presented here which give us the basics for Islamic political thought. In Sura Baqara (The Heifer) the Quran says: “And remember when your Lord said to the angels, I am going to place a successor (Khalifa) on Earth” (2:30). This verse is about the vice-regency of Adam. Then again in the chapter The Heifer about Abraham the Quran says: “And remember when the Lord of Abraham tried him with certain commands which he fulfilled. Allah said to him, verily, I am going to make you a leader (Imam) of mankind. Abraham said, ‘And my offspring? Allah said, ‘my providence includes not the wrong-doers (oppressors)’”(2:124). This verse shows that divine leadership is not for transgressors and tyrants. It is for righteous and just people.
In Sura Saad the Quran says: “O, David! Verily we have placed you as a successor (Khalifa) on the earth, so judge between men with truth and justice.” (38:26). David was not only a leader or caliph or prophet but he was ruler as well. Hence according to the Quran a ruler must be truthful and just. It is the religious obligation of a ruler to provide justice to everyone irrespective of color, cult, class, country and creed. In Sura The Adoration while talking about the children of Israel the Quran says: “And we appointed from among them, leaders (Imams), giving guidance under our command, so long as they preserved with patience and continue to have faith in our signs” (32:24). Hence we see that patience and faith are the basic requirements for divine leadership.
In Sura Al-Qasas the Quran says: “And we wished to be gracious to those who were being depressed in the land, to make them (Imams) leaders and make them heirs. (28:5). This verse shows that Allah condemns transgressors and oppressors and divinely helps the oppressed ones making them leaders and heirs on the basis of justice and piety. Then at another place the Quran alludes about divine rulers as a man of physical fitness and of knowledge. According to Sura The Heifer in verse 247 the Quran tells us about Jalut appointed as king because of his knowledge and physical prowess. The Shias consider Imam Ali fit for these merits.
In Sura Al-Nisa (The Women) The Quran says: “O you who believe! Obey Allah, and obey the Messenger, and those charged with authority among you” (4:59). The above cited verses give us the basics of Islamic political morality. These verses tell us that a leader or a ruler in Islamic state must be a man of certain qualities. Muslim political thinkers like Al-Mawardi and Ibu Katiba also write that a Muslim ruler must be a pious, knowledgeable and just man with administrative qualities. There are numerous sayings of the Holy Prophet that instruct us to obey the men of piety and virtuosity. The tyrants and evil-doers must not be accepted as leaders or rulers.
These passages leave unanswered the question of how a ruler is to be chosen. Is it through nomination or through elections? On this point we find Muslims divided. The Sunni sect believes that the Holy Prophet did not appoint his successor. He totally left it up to the Ummah (community). The Sunnis believe in “Ijmah”(consensus), which, of course bears some similarity to democracy. They say that when the Holy Prophet was on deathbed, he asked Hazrat Abu Bakr to lead the prayers. To their way of thinking this request indicates the superiority of Hazrat Abu Bakr.
After the Holy Prophet of Islam died, the Helpers of Medina and the Immigrants of Mecca had a heated discussion on the right of caliphate. Both the groups exchanged hot words. According to Tabari ultimately Hazrat Omar presented the name of Hazrat Abu Bakr and he was elected in Saqifa Bani Saada. Then Hazrat Abu Bakr, on his deathbed, nominated Hazrat Omar as his heir, who in turn nominated six people and asked for elections amongst them. They were Abdur Rehman, Uthman, Ali, Talah, Zubair and Saad bin Waqas. Hazrat Uthman was elected. Ali did not participate in the competition. When Hazrat Uthman was assassinated the majority of people openly elected Hazrat Ali as their Caliph. The Sunnis maintain that, after these four guided caliphs, the Mawiyya turned the caliphate into a monarchy.
The book of Abu Aula Mududi, entitled “Caliphate And Monarchy” sheds ample light on this issue. Now, the Sunni clerics say that Mushawart (consensus and counseling) must be adopted for Islamic concept of Caliphate. By Islamic democracy they mean the election of pious, honest and just people.
By contrast, Western democracy can change the basic moral and divine laws and regulations. The Western parliaments have passed rules favoring and allowing homosexuality, which is not permitted in divine scriptures. In an Islamic democratic state, the basic rules are the divine rules and cannot be changed by the decision of majority. Sovereignty lies with God. We can make laws and rules that deal with day-to- day matters of life, but these laws should not be contrary to the basics of Islam. Hence we see that the Sunni modern thinkers support parliaments and democratic system.
On the other hand, the Shias say that the Holy Prophet (PBUH) had nominated Hazrat Ali as his successor. They believe in the concept of Immah, which means that the door of Prophethood was closed after the Holy Prophet Muhammad, and divine leadership (Immah) was prescribed by the Quran and the Prophet. They mostly quote from the Sura The Israelites the following verse: “On the Day when we will summon every people with their Imam (leader).” (17:71) By this verse the Shias mean that Hazrat Ali is their Imam and under his banner they will resurrect on the Day of Judgment. They say that when the Holy Prophet invited his near relatives to dinner and asked them to support Islam, none declared support except Hazrat Ali. On that occasion, the Prophet said; “O, Ali you are my brother, my minister and my successor.” The famous Western historian, Gibbon, in his book, “The Rise and Fall of the Roman Empire” also mentions this event. They also say that in Hadith-e-Thaqalan, quoted by Muslims, Tirmidli, Ahmed ibn Hanbal, Tibrani and Mustadrak Al-Hakim, the vicegerency of Hazrat Ali is proved. The Prophet’s pronouncement at Ghadeer-e-Khum, “whoever’s Master I am, then this Ali is his master” shows that Hazrat Ali was nominated as the heir by the Prophet of Islam.
The Shias also cite from the Sura the Consultation:” “No reward do I ask of you for this except the love of those near to (my) kin.” (42:23) By this verse they infer that the Household of the Holy Prophet on divine merits had the right of Caliphate (Khalafah) and leadership (Imamah). According to the Shia sect, it was Hazrat Ali who was the legal and divine heir of the Prophet.
But let us draw a conclusion out of this controversy. In my opinion, both the sects, the Sunnis and the Shias, believe in the divine merits of the status of caliphate and leadership. The Sunnis also believe in the Immah and Velayah of Hazrat Ali. Practically speaking, we have no other way but to go for elections and select pious and just people as our caliphs and leaders. Iran is a Shia state. They have a parliament, and they have a system of checks on the programs and policies created by the parliament. They have a council of guides. In Pakistan they have Islamic ideological council which deals with the laws. If there is any doubt about a law, it is referred to Islamic council for approval. This means that we have to adopt democracy to run the state. The Shia concept of Imamah also implies that the character of the leadership must be noble, just and righteous. If we regard these practices neutrally and impartially, we see that there is little basic difference in political thought between the Sunnis and the Shias. Both believe in the vicegerency of righteous individuals. The only way to see to it that such righteous people do indeed become leaders is Islamic democracy based in justice, peace and piety.
Finally, it is essential to mention that the Shias are known as “The Twelvers” because they believe in the spiritual and worldly leadership of the twelve Imamss from Imam Ali to Imam Mehdi. Some Shia clerics believe that as they were the pious and just personalities and also belonged to the Household of the Prophet. Hence, on merits, they had the right to be our caliphs (Khalifa) as well. However, after the disappearance from view of Imam Mehdi, we find some jurists (Faqaha) claiming to be his heirs, assistants, or the lieutenants. They are simply religious people. The majority of them refused to participate in politics.
Imam Khomeini, in his book entitled “Islamic Statem” has given the idea of the government of clerics. Another great Shia cleric, Ayatollah Shariat Madari, who was Imam Khomeini’s contemporary, did not agree with his political ideas and deeds. Even Imam Khomeini did not reject the modern method of democratic elections. This shows that practically we have to reject nomination and go for elections. In Sura Shura we find that even the Prophet is asked to council with people in day-to-day social and political matters. The concept of Imamah in the Ismailis and Bohras is a spiritual monarchy having no Islamic sanction. Hence it can be said that the Sunnis and the Shias have no other way but to act upon the Islamic democracy, which is based on freedom, equality, peace, progress, justice and piety and is enacted through general elections. Here we all unite and reject monarchy, militarism and fascism.
http://www.irfi.org/articles/articles_201_250/political_thought_of_islam.htm
Wednesday, July 9, 2008
Tuesday, July 8, 2008
Revisions Add to Islamic Moderation * Interview with Rafiq Habib | ||||||
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Dr. Habib argued that the revisions of Jihad Group and Al-Jama`ah Al-Islamiyyah can be regarded as a value added to the moderation of Islam, (Wasattiyah), and a peaceful approach toward change. Dr. Habib urged the heralds of those revisions to establish visions based on peaceful change, where this change itself can become a form of struggle that gathers the Islamic and national powers together, so that no violence happens anymore. Revisions: A Product of Experience IslamOnline.net (IOL): What are the real reasons behind the revisions? When and how did they start? Dr. Habib: I believe that the real reasons behind the revisions are included in the experience itself. This is because the use of violence in the process of internal change harmed all parties involved, including the Jihad-oriented groups, as well as the Egyptian society and the authorities. This also had a negative impact on the da`wah-oriented role of these groups as far as Al-Jama`ah Al-Islamiyyah is concerned. Moreover, it affected the sympathy of the masses that used to support them, whether Al-Jama`ah Al-Islamiyyah or Jihad Group. This means that the consequences of using violence led to "reassessing" this approach , and this was the real reason behind the revisions. This vision is supported by the fact that the ideas related to such revisions appeared for the first time in the beginning of the 1980s among those who were sentenced after the incident of President Sadat's assassination. However, they remained as individual ideas until they were adopted by the movements themselves; namely, Al-Jama`ah Al-Islamiyyah in 1997 and Jihad Group in 2007. IOL: How can one differentiate between the thoughts of takfir (accusing others of disbelief), which appeared in prisons during the 1960s, and the takfir-related thoughts, which appeared later during the 1970s, including the revisions that followed them? Dr. Habib: When the idea of takfir appeared during the 1960s at the hands of Shukri Mustafa and others, it was a product of the experience of prison. Consequently, it had nothing to do with the project of the Muslim Brotherhood, which appeared about four decades before that time. On their part, the Muslim Brotherhood could refute and overwhelm this idea from the very beginning. Yet, the takfir-related thoughts, which appeared during the 1970s, did not come as a result of the experience of prison, as they actually expressed an attitude that rejected life as a whole and the prevalent political conditions in Egypt and other Arab countries at that time. Thus, these thoughts continued and led to internal and external armed confrontations, which have been there since the 1970s until now. This is because such thoughts still exist in Al-Qaeda and other similar groups, and that is why we call what happened in the 1970s a "birth" of the phenomenon of a wide-ranging Islamic rejection of the existing state of affairs. Nevertheless, it is quite important to confirm that the revisions are not a "reassessment" of an attitude that rejects our present situation. They are only a reexamination of how to deal with this status quo. IOL: Some argue that the reason behind these revisions is the security pressures and cruel torture undergone by members of Jihad Group inside prisons. What do you think about this? Dr. Habib: First of all, if these revisions came as a result of torture, they would have appeared long before that. But, in fact, following the assassination of Sadat, these revisions started as a form of self-criticism, but they were limited to the idea of whether the assassination of Sadat had any positive effect or it only had a negative effect on the group with no change of the existing state of affairs in Egypt. Later on, the revisions turned into a collective, communal operation (i.e. they became group-based, not individual ideas). The first statement about them was made in 1997, but the security officials did not take them seriously. Anyway, the revisions were not to be made widely known under such circumstances, as the security officials of the time refused to have any dialogue with the Islamists and regarded violent security actions and reactions as the only solution. In my opinion, the security officials started to change their attitude, firstly when a new minister of the interior came to office and secondly after the incident of Luxor. This incident was a start of random violence undertaken by small groups that were not under the control of any leadership from the big groups. In 1998, the year following the first statement about the revisions, the security authorities dealt with this initiative prudently; then they started to react to it gradually. Of course, the security officials tried to use these revisions for their own interest, but the historic leaders of Al-Jama`ah Al-Islamiyyah reasoned that it was very important to prevent bloodshed because they realized that any opposite procedure might lead Egypt to a massive bloodshed as was the case in Algeria. The historic leaders of Al-Jama`ah Al-Islamiyyah cooperated with the security authorities because the latter gave them the opportunity to dialogue with the bases of the groups. Such cooperation was crucial, simply because if the revisions came out without enough accord concerning them among the bases, this would limit the impact of the revisions and allow for the emergence of groups seceding from Al-Jama`ah Al-Islamiyyah. IOL: Do you think that Al-Jama`ah Al-Islamiyyah and Jihad Group can be politically used against the Muslim Brotherhood?
Dr. Habib: I think that the security authorities are trying to make use of Al-Jama`ah Al-Islamiyyah and Jihad Group in the confrontation with the Muslim Brotherhood. But the authorities fear any political confrontation between them because the leaders of Al-Jama`ah Al-Islamiyyah and Jihad Group have a historical weight, which makes it dangerous — from the viewpoint of the ruling regime — to let them indulge in any political work. Besides, I believe that the leaders of Al-Jama`ah Al-Islamiyyah and Jihad Group may refuse to be used against the Muslim Brotherhood. Revisions and Cease of Violence IOL: Do you think that these revisions will close the door of violence in the future? Dr. Habib: I believe that these revisions can limit violence, but they cannot totally prevent it. Revisions of the religious rulings justifying takfir and assassination make it difficult to resort to the rulings themselves. Still, the phenomenon of violence did not come as a result of Shari`ah rulings but as a product of an existing state of affairs with which the rulings justifying takfir and assassination were a mere attempt of dealing with a rejected, complicated status quo. The problem is that this status quo has not changed so far, and this makes the reasons behind violence still present. Violence did not also come as a response to a religious idea. Rather, it was a political reaction to a rejected reality, and this reaction appeared in the form of an Islamic movement. The reason behind deterioration was not only economic or political; it included morals and values as well, which made it an inclusive civilizational collapse that required the appearance of Islamic movements seeking to bring the Ummah back to its religious and civilizational sources of reference. Thus, Al-Qaeda and its thought will remain during the coming years, especially because of the US and Zionist policies being practiced in the region. Additionally, this violence will sometimes extend into the inside of the Arab countries in consequence of the alliance between the Arab regimes and the Zionist-American project. But the part that is to be most affected by the revisions would be "violence versus ruling regimes." The incidents of violence may recede in the Arab countries, and the idea of undertaking violent actions in Western countries may slightly decline as well. In this way, there will be more focus on confronting the US and Israel in the regions witnessing military confrontations. By this I mean that the revisions will push Al-Qaeda (the real origin of repelling jihad), toward focusing on resisting the occupation. IOL: How far have these revisions influenced the trend of violence inside and outside Egypt? Dr. Habib: Egypt has played a central role in the history of both moderate and extremist Islamic movements since the beginning of the twentieth century. Most of the thoughts of violent movements stemmed from Egypt. A person like Sayyid Imam Ash-Sharif has an effective position inside and outside Egypt. That is why these revisions can play a role outside Egypt, but its role and effect may be besieged by the continuation of the US and Zionist policies, yet it is difficult for activists in the armed Islamic movement to turn to inactivity and apathy. Therefore, as I said, the best thing we hope for is that armed jihad be redefined and restricted to the occupied regions. IOL: Some argue that these revisions mainly serve the peaceful approach of change. What do you think? Dr. Habib: Obviously, the appearance of Al-Jama`ah Al-Islamiyyah's revisions represents an additional support to the moderation of Islam and the peaceful approach toward change. Such is a success of the Islamic school to which the Muslim Brotherhood belonged from the very beginning of its emergence. However, the real problem in the revisions, whether those of Al-Jama`ah Al-Islamiyyah or those of Jihad Group, is that they have not set a methodology of peaceful change as an alternative to the methodology of forceful change. So many times, these revisions would find it sufficient to confirm that the Islamic movement is in a stage of istid`af (i.e. weakness), and so it cannot use force as it is not yet qualified for this. This refers to a provisional cease of violence that would not turn into a permanent cease unless a peaceful methodology of change is set to be applied inside the Arab and Muslim countries. The armed jihad would then be restricted to "repelling jihad" or jihad against the occupiers. Incomplete Revisions? IOL: In your opinion, what do these revisions lack? Dr. Habib: The problem that these revisions raise is that they affect the members and leaders of existing movements, but they may not have a big impact on what we may call groups adopting random violence. Such are small groups that adopt the ideology of violence and undertake violent operations. Within a short period of time, they disappear and then other groups appear, as in the case of Taba incidents. This random violence needs a social and political treatment so that we may be able to treat the state of general rejection afflicting many youth. IOL: Following these revisions, how do you see the political future of the leaders and members of Jihad Group and Al-Jama`ah Al-Islamiyyah? Dr. Habib: The political status quo in Egypt is witnessing revisions by the armed groups released with the restriction that they abstain from indulging in politics. Meanwhile, the Muslim Brotherhood is being inclusively besieged in an attempt to drive its members away from the political arena. However, the door is left open for some groups belonging to extremist Salafism provided that they work only in the religious field without approaching politics. Because they are considered peaceful groups, they are also asked to confront the Muslim Brotherhood. Consequently, these groups can be confronted with the thoughts of radicalism and thoughts questioning their principles. This can eventually lead to keeping the Islamic movements away from the political arena. It can also raise generations within the society that adopt extremism. This, in turn, can pave the way for reproducing the ideology of violence. When the extremist thoughts are kept away from the political arena, they can easily turn into armed actions. This means that these trends construct a very wide base of Islamic radicalism without indulging their bases into any political work. This makes them more isolated, which can make them tend to radicalism. Moreover, they would have juristic views that justify using force for changing the status quo, but this can happen only when they feel that they are not weak. Future of Jihad Group IOL: Once again, do you think that Sayyid Imam (or Dr. Fadl) is the first influential factor behind the revisions of Jihad Group and Al-Qaeda at the international level? Dr. Habib: I think that Sayyid Imam was one of the most effective figures during a certain period of time, but the phenomenon of violence was not born because of a certain person or a certain group of persons. Rather, it came as a result of a historical moment to which those persons responded in a way that drew others who followed them. Even the violence-establishing ideology was taken from books; it existed from the beginning, but it was figured out based on a certain understanding of the status quo as well as a political vision that explained that convoluted status quo. Then, on the grounds of such vision, relevant rulings were deduced. Dr. Fadl is just redefining the status quo, which is still rejected according to him, but he is considering the Muslims' current state of affairs and knows that they are in a state of weakness. In this way, he deduces rulings conforming to the way he views this state of affairs. IOL: In your opinion, what are the challenges facing the leaders and members of Al-Jama`ah Al-Islamiyyah and Jihad Group following these revisions? Dr. Habib: Certainly, there is a security-related factor that precludes any political activity on the part of the leaders and members of Al-Jama`ah Al-Islamiyyah and Jihad Group. This includes hindering any organizational activities. Accordingly, the leaders said they would occupy themselves only with da`wah-oriented activities. Still, they can practice such daw`ah activities only as individuals, not as organized groups. This can eventually lead to the following question: "How can this form of da`wah reach the political field to change it according to the Islamic vision adopted by these groups?" This, in turn, means that these leaders are facing a primary challenge: setting a methodology of change that their followers and members comply with as a way to close the door of resorting to the methodology of violence. Another challenge is that any methodology of peaceful change will lead to some political activity. That is why I expect that these organizations and their leaders will try to practice da`wah with the tightest possible limits so that they can carry out wider activities of da`wah, after which they would reach the political arena once again. In the meantime, the Egyptian security authorities will besiege these leaders in an attempt to destroy their political and da`wah-oriented future. IOL: How do you see the future of Al-Jama`ah Al-Islamiyyah and Jihad Group after these revisions? Dr. Habib: As dubbed in the very beginning, these revisions were an initiative for stopping violence. Until now, they have not been turned into a complementary Islamic project that aims at changing the existing state of affairs. The initiatives started with suppressing the previous rulings justifying assassination. This was not because the leaders saw the then status quo as being better than what it used to be (according to their perception), but it was because they found out that using force during that time would harm their main goal: change. Accordingly, the related justifications would include the idea of istid`af (weakness) and the permission of tuqyah (hiding one's real beliefs to protect oneself from others in case of danger). This means that the leaders still reject the status quo and believe that it has to be changed, but they only suppressed the ruling calling for changing it by force. This vision is the beginning of a new stage but not a final one. Thus, if the revisions stop at this limit, Al-Jama`ah Al-Islamiyyah and Jihad Group will end historically; if the revisions present a new complementary vision, this will actually be a new birth with which those leaders will enter the field of politics. This is because the process of change will sooner or later reach the political field, even if it started with the social field. Religion and Violence IOL: Some say that all ideological projects, whether Arab or international, religious or secular, are deteriorating. What is your comment? Dr. Habib: I think that this argument is wrong, because there is no society without an ideological framework of reference. Also, there is not any political system without a source of reference. However, the utilitarian secularist vision has made some people think that the world is moving toward a state in which it would achieve interests without values. Such a vision is itself an ideology that has nothing to do with human values, as it is based on the absolute values of materialism. In our countries, however, we are trying to restore our identity and civilization. Therefore, the Islamic project will remain the real motivator for the idea of restoring our civilizational belonging, because our societies would deteriorate and fall apart because of the materialistic values. This would push them via the fitrah (natural disposition) toward restoring their human and spiritual values so that they can in turn restore their coherence, firmness, and progress. IOL: But how far is the phenomenon of violence connected to the phenomenon of religiosity? Dr. Habib: The seventies of the past century witnessed a phenomenon that we call resorting to religion. This phenomenon appeared because the society fully realized that its values and morals had started to deteriorate. Thus, the society started to restore its identity by restoring its religiosity. Such is the background from which reasonable religious revitalization came out, and so did the extremist religious thought, as well as the violence-based thought of the armed groups.
The phenomenon of extremism and violence, along with the phenomenon of religious revitalization, came as a result of deterioration in the societal status quo, as well as the deterioration of Egypt's position on the Arab and Islamic levels. Meanwhile, the authorities could not express those visions of religious revitalization in a way that would turn them into a project of renaissance and communal progress. With all these factors, the process of religious revitalization, which was basically motivated by a need to change the status quo, faced the following options: 1. To adhere to moderation. But the present circumstances would not make that easy. 2. To isolate itself from the status quo. But this would allow extremism to grow. 3. To face the status quo, But this would allow violence to appear, especially because peaceful confrontation with the status quo (which is the approach of the Muslim Brotherhood) would lead to violence on the part of the authorities (and this sheds some light on the reason behind the wide appearance of violence among Islamic trends). Therefore, I would assume that striking Islamic moderation and the peaceful methodology of change represented by the Muslim Brotherhood and others is considered a strike against the ideology on which the revisions are based. Moreover, this is apt to create an environment where extremism can widely grow up among the masses and appear again in violent forms. It is still important to understand the idea of violence as a methodology of change because it was based firstly on rejection of the status quo and secondly on the inexistence of channels for peaceful change. That is why I believe that the Egyptian authorities' policy of closing the door of peaceful change leads to the reappearance of violence. Meanwhile the revisions (including those of Sayyid Imam) try to qualify the Islamic trends that previously adopted violence for working in the peaceful political field. After all, the leaders of the revisions can delay the stage of political change, but they cannot cancel it. IOL: Finally, what is your advice for the proponents of revisions? Dr. Habib: We should greet the proponents of these revisions, for they endured many accusations and shouldered the burden of issuing such revisions when they were imprisoned. Yet, they should set up visions basically adopting peaceful change, so that such change can be a form of struggle that gathers the Islamic and national powers together. If the peaceful political struggle stops, this will open the door once again for the return of violence. |
Monday, July 7, 2008
Pakistan's Red Mosque: Start of Unrest - The Full Story Behind the Red Mosque Crisis
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The crisis in question is just the tip of the iceberg of a deep-rooted popular rage against Musharraf's policies that revealed since he came to power, especially when it comes to his alliance to the US, which is seen as a sign of religious and national disloyalty. Musharraf's decision to storm the Red Mosque came amid reports that he was in dire need to tell the US and his western allies that he is still powerful enough to firmly control the so called Islamic radicalism on the rise in Pakistan. Musharraf's message may be clear to some, but some others may perceive his excessive force policy as unjustified and totalitarian. But the question still lingering domestically and internationally is: What does the future hold for Musharraf and for the Pakistanis under his military rule?
The first and most serious problem started when the fatwa council affiliated with the Red Mosque, headed by Sheikh Abdul Aziz Ghazi, issued a fatwa in 2005 at the onset of clashes between the Pakistani forces and the tribes in the Waziristan region.
These students came under tear gas bombs and some of them were injured, but the police couldn't enter the school. However, the Ministry of Interior registered a criminal case against the two brothers in one of Islamabad police centers. The problem that escalated the conflict was the decision of the Islamabad municipality to demolish seven mosques in the city under the pretext that some of them were built on usurped government land and that some of them pose a security threat to some nearby senior government officials. The decision was a strange and serious one in the eyes of the Pakistani society, which is known to be a conservative one. Actually, the municipality had demolished two mosques on January 20, 2007. Jamia Hafsa and the Red Mosque's madrasah for males were among the schools that the municipality decided to demolish. But students of the madrasahs staged large demonstrations, spearheaded by Sheikh Abdul Aziz Ghazi and a galaxy of `ulamaa' (religious scholars), and they were able to stop the demolition process. Minister of Religious Affairs and Islamic Endowments Mohammed Ijazulhaq stepped in and asked the Interior Affairs Minister to stop the procedures of demolishing the mosque.
The female students of Jamia Hafsa took hold of the children's library neighboring their school on January 20, 2007, and they closed the library door and barred the government employees and the library goers from entering, saying that they would not leave the library except after the government sent a written guarantee pledging not to demolish schools and mosques. Although many prominent religious and political figures participated in a dialogue between the government and the Red Mosque administration, the problem wasn't solved. "We don't seek clashes but we will not stay silent over any obstacles in the way of implementing Shari`ah," he added. Some male and female students of the Red Mosque committed some negative acts in the Pakistani capital, and the government didn't use force in response. Some of these acts included closing a house, holding a woman under charges of joining a prostitution ring, kidnapping three policemen under the pretext that the police detained a group of Al-Faridia university students, demanding some merchants to stop selling records that spread what they regard as moral corruption, and issuing a fatwa against the female Minister of Tourism for hugging a French man.
In the fifties of the 20th century, the first preacher of the Red Mosque was Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, the father of both Sheikhs Abdul Aziz and Abdul Rashid Ghazi. He was born to a Baloch family in a village south of Pakistani Punjab region. He finished his primary Islamic education in the Punjab province then enrolled in a secondary school where the headmaster was Sheikh Mufti Mahmud, father of Malawi Fadhlurrahman who was the opposition leader in the Pakistani parliament.
Then he joined the Islamic Bennouria University in Karachi to make more studies on Hadith and graduated in 1957. Then he worked as a preacher, teacher, and imam in various Karachi schools and mosques for nine years. When the Pakistani capital was moved from Karachi to Islamabad at the era of the then president of Pakistan Mohammed Ayoub Khan, Sheikh Abdullah moved from Karachi to Islamabad and was nominated in the first mosque built in Islamabad upon the request and recommendation of Sheikh Mohammed Yousuf Al-Bannouri, one of the Pakistani renowned scholars who was a professor and director of the Hadith Department at the Bennouria university from which Sheikh Abdullah graduated.
It was in 1965 that Sheikh Abdullah, the Red Mosque's first preacher, started to engage in politics, at a time when the Khatm-ul-Nobowwa movement was active in 1973 and 1974. Most prominent of his mentors is Sheikh Al-Mufti Mahmoud, the secretary general of one of the Olema-ul-Islam society who was one of the active leaders in the movement and he is the sheikh who issued a fatwa endorsed by the parliament ruling that the Qadiani sect is an infidel one.
Owing to this relation between the mosque preacher and one of the active leaderships in the Khatm-ul-Nobowwa movement, the Red Mosque became one of the movement's most active centers in Islamabad. When the opposition launched its uprising to topple the government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, president of Pakistan between 1971-1973 and prime minister in 1977, Sheikh Abdullah actively participated in the protests.
When General Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq reached power in Pakistan in 1977, Sheikh Abdullah sought to cement relations with him given that the circumstances allowed such relations. These relations continued until the death of General Zia-ul-Haq in 1988.
Owing to his far-reaching relations with influential characters, whether senior government officials or prominent scholars, Sheikh Abdullah was invited to participate in most sessions that were held for discussing Pakistani issues, escorted by his eldest son Sheikh Abdul Aziz, whose father groomed to succeed him. http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&cid=1183484216983&pagename=Zone-English-Muslim_Affairs%2FMAELayout |
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